The evolving global monetary order by Jerry L. Jordan
his final decade of the millennium
has seen considerable financial market
turbulence. The old order is evolving.
How should we respond to what seems
to be emerging in monetary matters?
Certainly, it would be a “fatal conceit”1
to think that a group of economic archi-
tects could dream up a monetary struc-
ture to house the global financial sys-
tem for the new millennium. I hasten to
add that I do not suggest that we do
nothing. Rather, I believe that we
should be guided by Karl Brunner’s
prescription: the state should be “an
umpire in a positive sum game, not the
operator of a negative sum game.”2 I
contend that the same should be true of
any international organizations created
by nation-states.
International monetary developments in
recent years can be explained in the
context of powerful economic forces
challenging ossified domestic institu-
tions. By “institutions” I mean both or-
ganizations and sets of rules (such as
contract enforcement, labor laws, laws
of incorporation, and the judicial sys-
tem, or various types of economic con-
trols, such as wage, interest-rate, ex-
change, and capital controls). Some
institutions are intended to alter the
working of markets because the bene-
fits of intrusion are perceived to be
greater than the costs. That is the case
when political or social objectives seem
to be more important than economic ef-
ficiency. Objectives such as income re-
distribution—a political decision to
give priority to sharing wealth, rather
than creating wealth—result in institu-
tional arrangements that reduce the effi-
ciency of markets.
The study of institutional arrange-
ments and their consequences in the
second half of the twentieth century has
become a matter of learning what will
not serve in the future, rather than what
will best replace it. We have become
informed about the unintended conse-
quences of well-intended efforts by in-
ternational organizations and various
foreign-aid programs.
For example, the Bretton Woods Sys-
tem, established in the final days of
World War II, had built into it rules for
exchange-rate adjustment. Neverthe-
less, because of the asymmetry in the
way the rules worked, there proved to
be a rigidity that caused the system to
break, rather than bend, in the face of
specific economic forces—namely, the
debasement of what was intended to be
the anchor currency, the U.S. dollar.
The ultimate implication of a conflict
between powerful economic forces and
rigid political institutions is that institu-
tions must change, or they will fail.
There must be an effective political and
economic regeneration in which vari-
ous institutional arrangements, espe-
cially organizations, are adaptable to a
changing environment.
nThe Evolving Nature of
Institutions
Propelled by technological change and
chance economic events, the institu-
tions that define our global economy
undergo a continual process of change.
Qualities that enhance economic well-
being tend to survive, and those that do
not eventually disappear.
The idea that tangible manufactured
goods must compete not only in local
shops but also increasingly in the glo-
bal town square is obvious to everyone.
Yet the thought that institutional ar-
rangements are also tested against oth-
ers in the international arena is not so
well understood. Ideas must face com-
petition no less than goods and services.
Politicians have long known that they
must compete, but their focus was on
rivals in their own party or other politi-
cal parties in their country. What has
changed is the competition they face
from policies and institutional arrange-
ments in other countries. The voters are
not only the citizens at the local ballot
box, but also the financial-asset manag-
ers in global capital markets.
Domestic ballot-box voters respond
well to politicians who satisfy their
craving for wealth-sharing programs.
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for those who pursue the best wealth-
creation policies. Gaining the support
of one is almost sure to diminish sup-
port from the other.
Courts that will not enforce the con-
tracts and protect the property of their
own citizens will not be used by for-
eign trading partners. Banks that en-
gage in unsound local lending practices
cannot sustain the risk-adjusted rate of
return sought by foreign investors—
unless government guarantees transfer
risk exposure from banks and investors
to the general taxpayer. Governments
with unsustainable fiscal policies, such
as promising overly generous pensions
to citizens, will find it increasingly
difficult—or impossible—to raise suffi-
cient taxes or issue new debt to meet
their commitments.
In the end, just as trade barriers cannot
permanently withstand the competition
of better goods produced elsewhere, so
too exchange and capital controls can-
not serve as permanent obstacles to
pressure from capital-market voters
who constantly search for the best
wealth-creating environment.
nThe Lessons of Financial Crises
There is little doubt that recent crises
reflect financial discipline imposed on
countries’ policies and institutions by
the increased scrutiny of foreign inves-
tors and lenders.
International capital flows have proven
to be a mixed blessing for many econo-
mies in the post–World War II era. But
erecting obstructions to the free flow of
savings is not desirable, even if it were
possible. Instead, the challenge is to en-
sure that access to foreign capital is
more often a blessing than a curse.
Capital mobility does not in itself result
in monetary or exchange-rate crises. At
its roots, Mexico in 1994–95 did not
have a monetary crisis or an exchange-
rate crisis. Likewise, what ended up as
an Asian monetary or foreign-exchange
crisis did not start out as such.
Common to all of these and other epi-
sodes were government guarantees or
promises that ultimately were revealed
to be unreliable. The prior presence of
government guarantees (or implicit
promises) had induced behavior—rely-
ing on the guarantees or promises—that
altered incentives to the point where
risk/reward relationships were distort-
ed. Sometimes the guarantees took the
form of financial instruments—such as
Tesobonos in Mexico—exchange-rate
pegs, guaranteed loans to domestic
banks, or government-agency or nation-
alized-industry borrowing. The failures
of such arrangements in the crisis coun-
tries often became a monetary crisis or
an exchange-rate crisis. Such market-
corroding practices were already under-
mining sustainable prosperity even be-
fore access to foreign capital magnified
the distortions.
Merely allowing the value of a currency
to float does not eliminate the problems
revealed in fixed-exchange-rate regimes
confronted by financial crisis. Only a few
currencies in the world enjoy a reputa-
tion that permits either the issuing gov-
ernment or private borrowers the privi-
lege of selling obligations to foreigners
without incurring exchange-rate risk.
Under a fixed-exchange-rate regime,
the government stands ready to supply
foreign currency in exchange for the
domestic currency. Under a freely float-
ing exchange-rate regime, the govern-
ment makes no such promise. The risk
of exchange-rate depreciation from
overly expansionary monetary policy
means that interest rates paid by do-
mestic borrowers will be higher than
global market rates.
As we have often seen, however, gov-
ernments have sought to minimize the
interest differential by guaranteeing the
obligations that domestic banks and
other borrowers have incurred to for-
eign investors. This creates an unavoid-
able moral hazard. Furthermore, because
such guarantees involve a subsidy to
borrowers, the demand for them will al-
ways exceed the amount the govern-
ment can possibly honor. The nonprice
rationing of guarantees introduces po-
litical considerations into the allocation
of capital flows, further undermining the
discipline of market forces.
Institutional investors in global capital
markets conduct a continuous plebi-
scite on the political and economic pol-
icies developing in the nation-states of
the world. Seemingly, no economy is
immune to these pressures. Advances in
communications and information tech-
nologies have been revolutionizing all
the financial markets. Adverse judg-
ments by participants in such markets
can quickly and dramatically change
the price and availability of funds to
any borrower, large or small. It is be-
coming apparent that governmental
promises—whether in the form of
pegged exchange rates or deposit, loan,




Other twentieth-century institutional ar-
rangements coming under increasing
scrutiny are central banks and national
currencies. Certainly there are national
vested interests in maintaining local
governmental monopolies over the is-
suance of national media of exchange.
Beyond that, the idea persists that a
country has something called “mone-
tary sovereignty” and can therefore pur-
sue an “independent monetary policy.”
History demonstrates, however, that na-
tional currencies inevitably compete in
the international financial arena.
In globally oriented discussions, “mon-
etary independence” refers to the as-
serted benefit of having a central bank
and a national currency that permit a
country to choose independently “the
appropriate rate of inflation.” It is in-
creasingly difficult to understand what
such a statement means. If it means the
“politically acceptable” rate of inflation
from the standpoint of domestic con-
stituencies, then the inherent economic
inefficiencies of policies that systemati-
cally debase the purchasing power of
money mean less-than-potential wealth
creation. There are unavoidable wealth
redistributions and deadweight wealth
losses that result from debasement of
the currency, whether intended or not.
Traditional rationalizations for deliber-
ate inflation—such as claims of rigid
wages or implications for real exchange
rates—seem increasingly quaint.
To prosper, every economy needs
sound money. Changes in the money
prices of goods and assets convey in-
formation. If an economy’s monetary
unit is known to be a stable standard of
value,3  
then changes in money prices
will accurately reflect changes in the
relative values of goods and assets.
That is, price fluctuations signal chang-
es in the demand for, or supply of,
goods or assets. Resource utilization
then shifts toward more valued uses
and away from those less valued.However, if the information in changes
in money prices is contaminated by in-
appropriate monetary policies, false
signals are sent to businesses and
households. Bad decisions are made,
and resources are misallocated. Saving
and investment decisions are affected,
and standards of living fail to rise at
their potential rate.
It is now generally accepted that accel-
erations and decelerations of inflation
do not enhance economic performance.
Unanticipated inflations and deflations
also induce redistribution of wealth—
especially between debtors and credi-
tors—but they leave the average stan-
dard of living lower. The same is true
of devaluations or revaluations of the
external value of a currency. A govern-
ment’s decision to alter the exchange
rate of a currency that had been fixed
involves the breaking of promises.
Losses are imposed on someone.
If the internal value of a currency is not
stable, then the external value must ul-
timately reflect this. Clearly, if the do-
mestic purchasing power of a currency
falls, the external value must eventually
fall relative to stable currencies. The
notion that a country can maintain a
permanently fixed exchange rate while
tolerating domestic inflation has been
proven to be false numerous times.
If monetary sovereignty or indepen-
dence is not worth much in today’s
global capital markets, and if seignior-
age is quite small in a noninflationary
world, then the costs and risks associated
with a national central bank and a na-
tional currency become harder to justify.
Whatever the views of domestic politi-
cians, the trend in the behavior of busi-
nesses and households around the
world is unmistakable. In the absence
of fixed exchange rates, Gresham’s
Law no longer applies. What we now
see—where not prohibited by effective
severe punishment—is the use of
“high-confidence monies” driving out
the everyday use of “low-confidence
monies.”4 Just as the brand name of
running shoes is more important to
consumers than the location of the as-
sembly plant, so too the brand name of
currency used to denominate contracts
and trade assets is more important than
the local content or national origin of
the standard of value.
International brand identification of
goods evolved as governmental and
technological constraints diminished.
As we are now seeing, brand identifica-
tion of standards of value is also be-
coming more pervasive as the falling
costs of information and communica-
tions technologies make it increasingly
easy to compare the quality dimension
of standards of value.
Under the true gold standard of an ear-
lier era, most currencies were gold or
silver certificates—warehouse receipts
for the true standard of value. Then, in
the Bretton Woods period, a dollar,
firmly anchored to gold, served as a
standard of value, and other currencies
were defined in terms of the dollar. An
obvious twentieth-century trend was
the proliferation of national currencies,
especially as new nation-states emerged
from the breakup of the colonial em-
pires and the Soviet Union. What is
less apparent, though, is that while
there are now a great many currencies,
there are still very few standards of value.
In time, the emergence of national fiat
monies during the twentieth century, to-
gether with securities markets that al-
lowed the issuance of government
debts payable in fiat monies, will be
viewed as an experiment that made the
costs of monetary mischief increasingly
clear. Traditional justifications for mon-
etary independence will sound hollow,
and constraints on fiscal-policy actions
will become more binding.
nGuidelines for the New
Millennium
Following Hayek, I submit that ap-
proaches to international monetary
relations that foster competition among
alternative currency units are more like-
ly to enhance world welfare than sys-
tems, like Bretton Woods, which man-
date change directed by supranational
governmental bodies, which tend to
ossify over time.
Countries can take specific steps to al-
low and even encourage this competi-
tion. The first is to remove any capital
and exchange controls, including prohi-
bitions on deposits denominated in for-
eign currencies. Argentina went a step
further and clearly signaled its intention
to maintain monetary stability by grant-
ing people the legal right to contract
under any and all circumstances—
including tax payments and other trans-
actions with the government—in any
currency they might choose. Argentine
legislation requires courts to enforce
contracts in the currency specified
therein. This “specific performance”
law5 
provides a level playing field for
competition between the domestic and
foreign currencies.
During the Asian crises of 1997, broad
macroeconomic policies—fiscal poli-
cies, monetary policies, and balance-of-
payments accounts—did not raise any
warning flags. Instead, the less obvious
underlying flaws in the domestic finan-
cial markets (especially the banking
companies) were revealed to be perva-
sive. Undercapitalization, connected
lending, inadequate supervision, dura-
tion mismatches, uncovered exchange-
rate exposure, and other flaws were
revealed in the postmortem of the so-
called currency crises.
It is tempting to say that what is needed
is an international organization respon-
sible for working toward global adop-
tion of sound banking and other finan-
cial-market practices. However, the
idea of empowering a “conditionality
enforcer of first or only resort” is trou-
blesome. Some combination of carrots
and sticks will always be present.
Whether carrots or sticks dominate will
change over time, depending on per-
sonalities and political environment. I
doubt anyone would defend the view
that what is needed is a global financial
policeman/prosecutor/judge/jury/execu-
tioner all rolled into one. To some peo-
ple, the world’s capital markets may
seem, at times, like the wild, wild west,
but they would still stop short of a call
for a financial Judge Roy Bean.
Instead, following Mises,6we might
think that a financial night watchman
would better serve as the role model for
the professional staff of any interna-
tional organization that is empowered
to work on behalf of creditor nation-
states. A common element of all finan-
cial crises in recent years was the exist-
ence of government guarantees that
were revealed to be unsustainable. The
sooner the revelation, the better coun-
tries were equipped to eliminate the
distortions without a crisis. To this end,
an international organization might
truly add value.nFootnotes
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